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Abstract
We study how determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expec-
tations equilibrium may be a®ected by monetary policy when the cost channel of monetary
policy matters. We focus on both instrumental Taylor-type rules and optimal target rules.
We show that standard instrument rules can easily induce indeterminacy and expectational
instability when the cost channel is present. Overall, a naÄ ³ve application of the traditional
Taylor principle in this setting could be misleading. Regarding optimal rules, we ¯nd that
\expectational-based rules" do not always induce determinate and E-stable equilibrium.
This result stands in contrast to the ¯ndings of Evans and Honkapohja (2003) for the
baseline \New Keynesian" model. Yet, a policy that it is a source of instability under
learning in the baseline new keynesian model, i.e. \fundamental rule" under commitment,
is a possible antidote when the cost channel is active.
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11 Introduction
There is growing and recent empirical evidence showing hat the cost channel of monetary
policy, i.e. when the interest rate a®ects directly ¯rm's price setting behavior, has important
implications in both in°ation dynamics and the design of optimal monetary policy. Ravenna
and Walsh (2006, RW) and Chowdhury et. al. (2006) provide empirical evidence for the cost
channel in the U.S. and the Euro Area, respectively. Barth and Ramey (2001) ¯nd a signi¯cant
cost channel e®ect on U.S. data at industry level. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)
estimate a DSGE model of the U.S. economy and ¯nd that monetary policy operates also
through the supply side. From the normative point of view, RW show the e®ects of the cost
channel in terms of monetary policy and ¯nd that a trade-o® between stabilizing in°ation and
output arises endogenously as a consequence of the cost channel.
At the same time, a recent ongoing literature has begun to evaluate the stability under
learning of rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in New Keynesian Models. Using the
standard New Keynesian Framework (or baseline model) in which the cost channel is absent,
Bullard and Mitra (2002, BM hereafter) ¯nd that the determinacy and learnability of a variety
of instrument rules is guaranteed if the traditional Taylor principle is satis¯ed, i.e. the interest
rate reacts more than one-for-one to in°ation (also referred as active rules).1 In the same
framework, Evans and Honkapohja (2003, 2006, hereafter EH) show that optimal target rules
(under discretion or commitment) renders the REE always unstable under learning if the
optimal policy rule is derived based on the assumption that agents have rational expectations
(referred as \fundamental-based rule"). EH proposed an alternative implementation of the
optimal rule by relaxing the assumption of rational expectations on private agents, referred as
\expectation-based optimal rule", and ¯nd that this type of rules (which react optimally to
private sector expectations) can always induce determinacy and learnability. EH's economic
intuition relies on the fact that their proposed \expectation-based optimal rule" always satis¯es
the Taylor principle. Yet, the implications of the cost channel in terms of determinacy and
stability under adaptive learning (also referred as learnability) of the rational expectations
equilibrium (REE) have been left aside in the discussion.2
This paper examines the e®ects of the cost channel coupled with a variety of instrument
and optimal target rules on the determinacy (i.e. a unique and non-explosive) and learnability
conditions of the REE. Particularly, we study local determinacy and E-stability properties of
1Throughout the paper we will refer to those rules satisfying the traditional Taylor principle as active rules.
Otherwise, we will refer to passive rules.
2As Bullard (2006) pointed out, since adaptive learning is a \minimal deviation from rational expectations",
its stability should be viewed as an additional minimal criterion, besides determinacy, that a REE equilibrium
should meet.
2the REE in the cost channel model proposed by RW (2006).34 In this sense, our work extends
BM's (2002) and EH's (2003, 2006) baseline-economy results to a cost-channel framework.
We perform the analysis of instrumental rules under two speci¯cations. In the ¯rst one, the
interest rate reacts to current values; this is called contemporaneous data speci¯cation. In
the second one, the interest rate reacts to forward expectations; this is called forward-looking
rule speci¯cation (also referred as forward expectations or forecast-based rules). In the case of
target rules and in the same fashion of EH (2003, 2006), we analyze \fundamental-based" and
\expectations-based" rules under both discretion and commitment.
Overall, our analytical ¯ndings show that the cost channel in°uences both determinacy and
learnability conditions, making them more stringent with respect to the baseline new Keynesian
model. In the case of the contemparaneous data instrument rule, our analytical condition for
determinacy is consistent with that of E-stability. This condition can be interpreted as the
long-run version of the Taylor principle which, as stated by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and
Woodford (2003, Chapter 4, section 2), implies that in the long-run the nominal interest rate
should be raised more than the increase in in°ation. Yet, in the model with the cost channel its
implications di®er importantly from those of the baseline new Keynesian framework. In fact,
in the baseline model the traditional Taylor principle implies its long-run version (that is if
the Taylor rule has an in°ation coe±cient larger than one, it generates both determinacy and
learnability) and therefore it is a su±cient condition for both determinacy and learnability.
Instead, to the extent that the cost channel is present, the traditional Taylor principle might not
imply its long-run version and therefore it becomes a necessary but not su±cient condition.
This result is striking since standard policies recommended to the baseline new Keynesian
framework (as in BM) to guarantee determinacy and E-stability may not be e®ective or could
even be counterproductive if the cost channel is present.
Under forecast-based rules, a crucial result is that, unlike to BM (2002), the Taylor principle
does not guarantee either a determinate or an E-stable equilibrium, i.e. besides the long-run
taylor principle additional conditions are also required for both determinacy and learnability.
Moreover, even with a null response to the output gap, if the cost channel is strong enough and
the nominal interest rate is adjusted according to the traditional Taylor Principle (positively
and more than one-for-one reaction to expected in°ation) a determinate and E-stable REE is
not necessarily attainable. This result rises doubts about the validity of the Taylor principle
3Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001) developed the criterion of Expectational Stability (or E-stability): the
conditions under which agents are able to learn (through least squares) the reduced form dynamics under the
assumption of rational expectations. E-stability therefore provides a robustness criterion: if agents make small
mistakes in expectations relative to those consistent with the associated REE, then a policy rule that is E-stable
ensures such mistakes are corrected over time.
4Even so learnability is a more general concept than E-stability, throughout the paper we will use both terms
interchangeably.
3as a useful guideline for forward-looking instrument rules when the cost channel is present.
Under optimal policy rules, our results can be summarized as follows. First, under discre-
tion, we ¯nd that a "fundamental-based" optimal policy rule, that is, an interest rate rule that
reacts only to fundamental shocks, implies that the equilibrium is indeterminate and unstable
in the learning dynamics, results that coincide with those of EH (2003). Following EH (2003)
we also derive an "expectations-base" rule that might, allegedly, perform well in both grounds.
In fact, EH (2003) show that if the central bank assumes that the private sector does not have
(initially) rational expectations, the resulting optimal "expectations-based" interest rule, ren-
ders the equilibrium always determinate and E-stable. However, di®erent from EH, we show
that the implied "expectations-based" rule does not always lead to stability under learning
dynamics. Second, under optimal commitment, we ¯nd that the "fundamental-based" policy
can be E-stable for a given parameter arrangement, contrasting with EH (2006) who show that
this class of optimal rules is never stable under learning. Hence, to the extent that the cost
channel is present, the policymaker¶s ability to commit to an optimal policy when the policy
reaction function depends on fundamentals and lagged endogenous values, could be su±cient
to stabilize the economy5.
In summary, the presence of cost channel imposes some di±culties to the central bank in
achieving a determinate and learnable equilibrium even if the traditional Taylor principle holds
or the monetary authority optimally reacts to private sector expectations. Therefore, BM and
EH¶s proposed resolutions might not always perform well.
Our paper contributes to an important strand literature that has been studying determinacy
and E-stability when the supply-side e®ects of monetary policy matter. BrÄ uckner and Schabert
(2003) only study determinacy and point out that the cost channel introduces an additional
upper bound to the in°ation reaction in the Taylor rule. Surico (2006) ¯nds that if a central
bank assigns positive weight to output °uctuations a model with cost channel is more prone
to multiple equilibria (indeterminacy) relative to the standard one.6 Benhabib et. al. (2001)
show that, depending on the way money is introduced (e.g. money in the production function),
some forms of active monetary policy bring about indeterminacy. Kurozomi (2006) proves that
even a small degree of non-separability between consumption and money balances in the utility
function causes the Taylor rule to be much more likely to induce indeterminacy or E-instability.
Particularly, Kurozomi's analysis show the traditional Taylor principle may render the REE
to be indeterminate and E-unstable.7
5This ¯nding conccurs with those of Du®y and Xiao (2005). They ¯nd that if one includes the interest rate
deviations in the objective, E-stability can be achieved without requiring the central bank to react to private
sector expectations.
6Surico (2006) performs only determinacy analysis of Taylor rules with smoothness in the interest rate. The
author focuses on two speci¯cations of Taylor rules, namely contemporaneous and lagged data.
7Kurozomi (2006) stresses on the fact that the traditional Taylor principle does not always implies its long
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines RW's model and discusses
its main di®erences with respect to the baseline model. Section 3 describes the analysis of
determinacy and learning under instrumental and target rules. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Simple Environment
In this section we summarize the log-linearized version of the model presented in RW . The
model can be summarized by the following equations (equations 27 and 28 in RW¶s paper):
¼t = ·xxt + ¯Et¼t+1 + ±·it + ¹t (1)
xt = Etxt+1 ¡
1
¾
(it ¡ Et¼t+1) (2)
· ´ [(1 ¡ µ¯)(1 ¡ µ)=µ] and ·x ´ ·(´ + ¾): Variable xt is the output gap, ¼t in°ation and
it is the percentage point deviation of the nominal interest rate around its steady state value.
In the model, ¹t represents the traditional cost-push shock and Et symbolizes the standard
expectation operator. We implicitly base our analysis of learning and monetary policy on \Eu-
ler Equation" approach as it is suggested in Honkapohja, Mitra and Evans (2003). Therefore,
throughout the paper we assume that our systems are valid under both rational expectations
and learning. In this sense, the expectation operation is taken to describe aggregate behavior
regardless of the precise nature of agents' expectation formation.8
Equation (1) is a short run aggregate supply (AS) curve that relates in°ation with the
output gap and the nominal interest rate. The parameter ¯ denotes the discount factor and
·x captures the sensitivity of in°ation to movements in the output gap that depends on deep
parameters such as the degree of price stickiness captured by µ and the inverse of the elasticity
of the labor supply ´. Equation (2) is a IS curve that relates the output gap inversely to the
domestic interest rate and positively with the expected future output gap. In this equation 1
¾
represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Note that the previous two-equation system di®ers from the standard new Keynesian model
(see Woodford 2003) due to the presence of the nominal interest it in the staggered price
equation, i.e. the cost channel of monetary policy. The existence of the cost channel is justi¯ed
if ¯rms must borrow working capital from intermediaries (for further details see RW). Just for
comparison we de¯ne ± which is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1 when there is cost
channel and 0 where there is not (baseline model). We assume that ¹t evolves according to an
run version unless the central bank does not target the output gap.
8Recently, Preston (2005) has proposed an interesting reformulation of intertemporal behavior under learning
in which agents are assumed to incorporate a \subjective version" of their intertemporal budget constraint into
their behavior under learning. In this paper, we abstract from this approach.
5exogenous ¯rst order autoregressive process
¹t = ½¹t¡1 + "t (3)
where "t is an i.i.d noise with variances ¾2
" . Finally, 0 · ½ < 1 is the correlation parameter.
3 Determinacy and E-stability
We supplement equations (1) through (2) with a policy rule for the interest rate it that repre-
sents the behavior of the monetary authority. Here we study interest rate policy rules which
have been extensively studied in the literature: instrumental and target rules. The main ques-
tion is whether such rules lead to determinacy and stability under adaptive learning. The
follwing propositions will show that either the traditional Taylor principle or EH¶s proposal
to the resolution of the instability under learning cannot be taken for granted when the cost
channel matters.
3.1 Instrumental Rules
In this subsection, we consider Taylor type of rules being evaluated with both contemporaneous
data and forward expectations as in BM (2002).
3.1.1 Contemporaneous data in the Taylor Rule
We ¯rst assume a simple Taylor type rule (see Taylor 1993) in which the central bank reacts
to price in°ation and the output gap
it = Á¼¼t + Áxxt (4)
where Á¼ and Áx are non-negative which measure the degree of responsiveness of the policy
interest rate to in°ation and output gap, respectively.
Substituting the policy rule (4) into (1) and (2), we can write the model involving the two
endogenous variables xt and ¼t
yt = ¡ + ­Etyt+1 + k¹t (5)
wt = ½wt¡1 + "t
6where yt = [¼t;xt]0;wt = ¹t;¡ = 0; and
­ = Ã
"
¾¯ + ·x + ¯Áx + ±·Áx ¾ (·x + ±·Áx)
1 ¡ ¯Á¼ ¡ ·Á¼ ¾ (1 ¡ ±·Á¼)
#
(6)
with Ã = (¾ + Áx + ·xÁ¼ ¡ ±·¾Á¼)
¡1 :
Determinacy is analyzed by asking under which conditions ­ has both of its eigenvalues
inside the unit circle.9 Propositions 1 summarizes the necessary and su±cient conditions for
determinacy.
Proposition 1. Under contemporaneous data interest rate rules the necessary and su±cient
conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be determinate are that
µ
1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·
·x
¶
Áx + Á¼ > 1 (7)
2¾ (1 + ¯) + (1 + ¯ + ±·)Áx + (·x ¡ 2±·¾)Á¼ + ·x > 0 (8)
Proof. See appendix A.
Condition (7) can be interpreted as a generalization of the long-run Taylor principle that
guarantees both determinacy and E-stability in the baseline "New Keynesian" framework; see
Woodford (2003) and BM (2002). The di®erence between the conventional long-run Taylor
principle and this generalized version relies on ·; which measures the impact of the interest
rate on the in°ation rate through the cost channel. In the line of Woodford (2003), this
generalized version of the long run Taylor principle has the following economic interpretation:
each percentage point of permanently higher in°ation implies a permanent change in the output
gap of (1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·)=·x percentage points. Under the baseline case (± = 0); it is clear that any
increment in the steady-state in°ation leads to a higher output gap whereas under the cost
channel (± = 1); it may lead to a permanent reduction in the output gap.10 The left-hand-
side of (7) determines the long run increase of the interest rate given by the Taylor rule for
each unit of increment in the steady-state in°ation rate. Note that under the cost channel
the traditional Taylor principle, Á¼ > 1; may not longer imply its long run version as in the
baseline case. This implication is less likely to occur if either the cost channel or the reaction
to the output gap in the Taylor rule is weak. For example, in the case in which the Taylor
rule does not respond to the output gap, i.e. Áx = 0; condition (7) collapses to the traditional
Taylor principle.
9For details see Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
10The output gap increases in the long run if 1 ¡ ¯ > ·:
7Inequality (8) is a second necessary condition for determinacy. In the baseline "New Key-
nesian" model, such condition is redundant and hence does not impose any constraint on the
policy parameters. Nevertheless, when the cost channel is active, condition (8) may impose ad-
ditional restrictions for determinacy. Assuming ± = 1 and replacing ·x in the term ·x¡2±·¾, it
is straightforward to note that condition (8) binds if the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of the substitution is greater than the inverse of the elasticity of the labor supply, ´ < ¾. The
previous implication is important because even in the case in which the central bank does not
respond to the output gap, the traditional Taylor principle will not longer guarantee determi-
nacy. To see this, note that if Áx = 0; Á¼ is two-sided constrained and therefore the traditional
Taylor principle is not a su±cient condition for determinacy.
1 < Á¼ <
2¾ (1 + ¯) + ·(´ + ¾)
·(¾ ¡ ´)
The economic intuition goes as follows: if the central bank's aggressiveness against in°ation
is too high, ¯rms will raise prices even for a negative output gap, when the cost channel is
active. In that case, the cost channel e®ect dominates the reduction of real wages (due to
lower output) in such a way that high enough interest rates can generate self-ful¯lling in°ation
expectations. Note that, the higher is the labor supply elasticity (i.e. the lower ´), the lower
is the reduction of real wages in response to a lower output. Moreover, the lower is the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (i.e. the higher is ¾), the weaker is the e®ect of the
interest rate (through the traditional demand channel) on the output gap and consequently
on real wages and in°ation. Under both cases, the cost channel o®sets the e®ect of a negative
output gap and hence indeterminacy follows.
To study the stability of REE under adaptive learning, we follow Evans and Honkapohja
(2001, chapter 10) and assume that agents utilize a perceived law of motion (PLM) for yt that
corresponds to the minimal state variable (MSV) solution (see McCallum 1983) to the system
(5). The PLM can be written as:
yt = a + c¹t
Using this PLM, agents form expectations of yt+1 :
Etyt+1 = a + c½¹t:
Plugging these expectations into (5) delivers a T-mapping from the PLM to the actual law of
motion (ALM):
yt = Ta(a) + Tc(c)¹t:
8The rational expectations solution consists of values such that a = Ta(a) and c = Tc(c):
The answer of the question of whether the system (5) is stable under learning is given by
the principle of E-stability, which comes from analyzing the local asymptotic stability of the
following matrix di®erential equation
@T (a;c)
@¿
= T (a;c) ¡ (a;c)
evaluated at the REE solution (a;c): Speci¯cally, the REE solution of the system (5) is E-stable
or learnable if all real parts of the eigenvalues of
DTa (a) = ­
DTc (c) = ½0 ­ ­
are lower than 1.
McCallum (2007) shows that determinacy is a su±cient (though not necessary) condition
for E-stability for a broad class of models, including the one in this paper. Hence, the gen-
eralized long run Taylor principle and condition (8) are su±cient for E-stability, i.e. all RE
solution of (5) has the property of E-stability. Yet, we further need to check whether an
indeterminate equilibria are E-stable or not. Propositions 2 summarizes the necessary and
su±cient conditions for E-stability.
Proposition 2. Under contemporaneous data interest rate rules, the necessary and su±cient
condition for an MSV solution (0;c) to be E-stable is that
µ
1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·
·x
¶
Áx + Á¼ > 1 (9)
Proof. See appendix B.
Condition for E-stability given in Proposition 2 is identical to the generalized long run
Taylor principle de¯ned above. Therefore, determinacy is su±cient for E-stability. Yet, if
condition for determinacy (8) is not redundant, i.e. ´ < ¾; indeterminate equilibria may be
learnable. In order to gain an insight into the e®ects of the cost channel and the alternative
policy rules speci¯cations on determinacy and learnability conditions, we illustrate the results
by using a calibrated case. Table 1 summarizes the benchmark parameterization.




























Figure 1: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for contemporaneous data policy rules. Left panel
corresponds to the baseline model (± = 0). Right panel corresponds to the cost channel model (± = 1):
Table 1: Baseline Parameterization
± Dichotomous parameter for the cost channel 0 or 1
µ Probability of not adjusting prices 0:75
¯ Discount factor 0:99
¾ Coe±cient of risk aversion 1:5
´ Inverse of the elasticity of labor supply 1
Á¼ Reaction to in°ation 0 · Á¼ · 12
Áx Reaction to output gap 0 · Áx· 4
Parameters ´ and ¾ are taken from RW (2006). We let ± to take two possible values: 0 or 1,
where the former characterizes baseline model, whereas the latter characterizes the model with
the cost channel. As it is common in the literature on the Calvo (1983) pricing technology, we
let the probability of not adjusting prices, µ = 0:75: We set ¯ to be equal to 0:99, which implies
an annualized of real interest rate of 4%. As in BM (2002) we calibrate the policy reaction
parameters for non-negative values.
Figure (1) depicts determinacy and E-stable regions as functions of both Á¼ and Áx, with the
rest of the parameters set at their baseline values. The ¯gure of the left side depicts the baseline
case (± = 0) whereas the ¯gure of the right shows the cost channel case (± = 1). The main
10e®ect of the cost channel is to rotate the line describing the border between the determinate
and E-stable region and indeterminate and E-unstable region. That border is given by the
generalized long-run Taylor principle (equations 7 and 9). Under the cost channel, the set of
parameter values in the policy rule that are consistent with determinacy and learnability are
a subset of those for the baseline model. This is because ·; which measures the e®ect of the
cost channel, alters long-run Taylor principle implied by the "new keynesian" case. In the
calibrated case the slope of the long-run Taylor principle switches from negative to positive
since 1 ¡ ¯ < · (the same holds under alternative calibrations considered in Table 2 below).
Three implications arise when the cost channel is active. First, in contrast to the baseline
model, the traditional Taylor principle, Á¼ > 1; does not always imply its long-run version
and hence, (if Áx > 0) such policy may not be su±cient for both determinacy and E-stability.
Second, a passive policy reaction to in°ation, i.e. Á¼ < 1; never generates determinacy and E-
stability. Third, since in the parameterization ´ < ¾, another implication of the cost channel
is that the reaction to in°ation has a upper bound for determinacy. Thus, provided a null
response to the output gap, Á¼ must lie between 1 and 144 (not shown in the graph) to
guarantee a determinate equilibrium while in the baseline model a Á¼ bigger than 1 is su±cient
for determinacy.
3.1.2 Forward data in the Taylor rule
\Forward expectations" Taylor rules adopt the following form
it = Á¼Et¼t+1 + ÁxEtxt+1 (10)
where Á¼ and Áx are non-negative. We reduce the system of equations (1), (2) and (10) to two
equations involving the endogenous variables xt and ¼t: The reduced system takes the form of





±·¾Á¼ ¡ ·x (Á¼ ¡ 1) + ¾¯ ·x¾ ¡ ·xÁx + ±·¾Áx
¡(Á¼ ¡ 1) ¾ ¡ Áx
#
(11)
The following proposition summarizes the necessary and su±cient conditions for a rational
expectations equilibrium to be determinate.
Proposition 3. Under interest rate rules with forward expectations the necessary and su±cient
11conditions for determinacy are that
(¯ + ±·)Áx ¡ ±·¾Á¼ < ¾ (1 + ¯) (12)
±·¾Á¼ ¡ (¯ + ±·)Áx < ¾ (1 ¡ ¯) (13)
(1 + ¯ + ±·)Áx + (·x ¡ 2±·¾)Á¼ < 2¾ (1 + ¯) + ·x (14)
µ
1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·
·x
¶
Áx + Á¼ > 1 (15)
Proof. See appendix C.
The analysis of E-stability is analogous to section 3.1.1 above. The following proposition
provides the conditions for E-stability of the MSV solution.
Proposition 4. Under interest rate rules with forward expectations, the necessary and su±-
cient conditions for an MSV solution (0;c) to be E-stable are that
±·¾Á¼ ¡ (¯ + ±·)Áx < ¾ (1 ¡ ¯) (16)
µ
1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·
·x
¶
Áx + Á¼ > 1 (17)
Proof. See appendix D.
Propositions 3 and 4 show that the cost channel alters the conditions for both determi-
nacy and learnability relative to the baseline model. Again, the generalized long-run Taylor
principle is a necessary condition for determinacy and E stability and thus the same implica-
tions discussed in section 3.1.1 apply. Yet, a Taylor rule with forward expectations requires
additional conditions not only for determinacy but also for E stability11. For example, to the





whereas conditions (15) and (17) imply the traditional Taylor principle
Á¼ > 1 (19)
Notice that under the baseline case (± = 0), the ¯rst inequality (18) goes to in¯nite and hence
11Note that condition (13) never binds if ± = 0. Hence, under the baseline "New Keynesian" model the
long-run Taylor principle is necessary and su±cient for E-stability as BM showed. Yet, this does not hold when
the cost channel is active.





























Figure 2: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for forward expectations policy rules. Left panel
corresponds to the baseline model (± = 0). Right panel corresponds to the cost channel model (± = 1):
the traditional Taylor principle is a necessary condition for both determinacy and E-stability.12
In contrast, under the cost channel (± = 1), the limit given by (18) can be higher or lower than
1. If the limit (18) is below 1, i.e. 1¡¯ < ·; and the policy reaction to the output gap is zero
(i.e. Áx = 0);determinacy and E-stability are never attainable.13 The latter is a remarkable
result since the idea that the Taylor principle or \active" policy leads to determinacy and
stability under learning is a celebrated result in the literature.
To illustrate these ¯ndings, ¯gure (2) plots the intersections of the regions of determinacy
and learnability. The ¯gure of the left side depicts the baseline case (± = 0) whereas the ¯gure
of the right shows the cost channel case (± = 1). The ¯gure of the left indicates that a forecast-
based Taylor rule described by Á¼ > 1 and a relatively small response to output gap guarantees
a determinate and learnable equilibrium. Moreover, a passive reaction to in°ation may also
promote stability if it is accompanied by a su±cient reaction to the output gap. Contrary to
this baseline case, when the cost channel is active the traditional Taylor Principle (i.e. Á¼ > 1)
does not guarantee a determinate and E-stable equilibrium even if Áx is zero14. Overall, the
12As emphasized by BM (2002), under forward expectations speci¯cation Á¼ has an upper bound given by
condition (14). Hence, the traditional Taylor principle is a necessary but not su±cient condition for determinacy.
Yet, the traditional Taylor principle is necessary and su±cient for E-stability in the model without cost channel.
13Notice that if 1 ¡ ¯ < ·; the long run Taylor principle is not implied by its traditional version; see section
3.1.1 for a detailed discussion.
14This result holds for the alternative calibrations see Table 2.
13area of determinacy and E- stability that induce determinacy and learnability shrinks notably.
A key question is why indeterminacy is more likely under the cost channel. As was discussed
in the case of contemporaneous rules, indeterminacy under the cost channel arises because the
supply-side e®ect of the interest rate, namely the cost channel, outweighs the demand-side
e®ect. This implies a narrower range for the reaction to in°ation in the policy rule, but still
an active policy may guarantee a determinate equilibrium (as long as the in°ation reaction is
not too high and the reaction to output gap is nil or moderate). Yet, under forward-looking
rules, indeterminacy emerges if the interest rate responds more than one-for-one to in°ation
expectations and it does not respond to output °uctuations. The economic intuition is that a
rise in the interest rate (due to in°ationary expectations) induces an increase in the current
real interest rate, which not only reduces the current output gap and real wages, but also rises
future output gap and hence renders in°ation expectations to be self-ful¯lling.15 A modest
reaction to output gap expectations may dampen output gap expectations and therefore may
alleviate the problem of indeterminacy (and instability under learning).
3.2 Target Rules
In this section we study those rules that can be implemented optimally under both discretion
and commitment as in EH (2003, 2006). For each case, we study two forms of implementing
an optimal rule through a linear reaction function for the interest rate. The ¯rst form is
called \fundamental based" rule and is derived under the assumption of rational expectations.
The second form is called \expectations-based" rule and is derived under the assumption that
agents do not posses (initially) rational expectations.
3.2.1 Discretionary Policy
We now take the standard formulation of the central bank's loss function similar to the one










where ¸ is the relative weight of output deviations. Following EH (2003), we treat ¸ as free
positive parameter. Yet, RW derive a microfounded optimal ¸ as a function of deep parameters.





15Higher output gap in the next period arises as a consequence of two factors. First, higher consumption due
to the intertemporal substitution. Second, lower production due to the cost channel.
14Optimal monetary policy under discretion implies to minimize (20) subject to versions of
(1) and (2) equations modi¯ed to take into account the central bank's lack of commitment. It
is straightforward to obtain the optimal condition that shows the trade-o® between stabilizing





where ·o ´ ·x ¡ ±·¾ ´ ·[´ ¡ (± ¡ 1)¾]: Note that when ± = 0; ·o = ·x = ·(´ + ¾) and we
get back to the standard trade-o® found in Clarida et. al. (2000, hereafter CGG), whereas
when ± = 1 we have that ·o = ·´: Note also that the cost channel entails larger volatility of
in°ation since ·(´ + ¾) > ·´ (see RW 2006 for further details).
Fundamental-based reaction function EH (2003) discussed several forms of implement-
ing the optimal plan given by (21). A ¯rst form is called \fundamental based" rule and implies
that the central bank assumes that private agents have perfectly RE and that the REE takes
the form of the MSV solution. Under such assumptions, the \fundamental based" rule for the
interest rate reacts only to fundamental shocks.16
it = Á¹¹t (22)
We reduce the system of equations (1), (2) and (22) involving the endogenous variables xt and









Note that the matrix (23) is independent from ± and it is exactly the same matrix analyzed by
EH (2003). Thus, irrespective of whether the cost channel is present or not, the \fundamental-
based" optimal interest rate rule always leads to indeterminacy and instability under learning.
In fact, EH (2003) prove that any linear policy rule of the form of (22) induces both indeter-
minacy and E-instability.
Expectations-based reaction function EH (2003) propose a second form, referred as
\expectations-based" rule, which is derived under the assumption that agents do not posses
RE and that their expectations can be observed by the central bank. The \expectations-based"
16EH (2003) consider a more general case in which ¯scal shocks appear in the fundamental-based reaction
function. It is straightforward to show that the result of this section applies to the general case.
15optimal rule under discretion is obtained by solving it from the structural equations (1) and
(2) and the optimal condition (21)
it = Á¼Et¼t+1 + ÁxEtxt+1 + Á¹¹t (24)
where the coe±cients are
Á¼ =




























where s refers to the \standard" case.
We highlight that, regardless of whether the cost channel is active or not, the traditional
Taylor principle holds under the \expectations-based" rule. That is, not only Ás
¼ > 1 as EH
(2003) point out, but also Á¼ > 1 (the latter derives from ·o < ·x). Besides, numerical results
show the optimal reaction under the cost channel model (Á¼) is lower than the one under the
standard case (Ás
¼).17 In addition, given that ·o < ·x; the optimal reaction to output gap
expectations under the cost channel is bigger than the one under the standard case.
The reduce form of the model under (24) takes the form of (5), where ­ is de¯ned by
­ = Ã
"
(¯ + ·±)¸ ±¾¸·
¡·o (¯ + ±·) ¡±¾··o
#
(25)
with Ã = (¸ + ·o·x ¡ ±·¾·o)
¡1 :
The system is determinate if and only if matrix ­ has both eigenvalues inside the unit
circle and E-stable if all eigenvalues of ­ ¡ I have negative real parts. One of the roots of ­
17The same result hold for di®erent calibrations and di®erent values of ¸: The results are available upon
request.
16is zero and the other one is given by
r =
¸(¯ + ·±) ¡ ·¾±·o
¸ + ·o·x ¡ ·¾±·o
Note that under the standard case, i.e. ± = 0; r is positive and lower that 1, thus determinacy
and E-stability immediately follows (see EH 2003). Under the cost channel, however, we found
that only a subset of the parameter space is related to either determinacy or E-stability (see
propositions 5 and 6). Therefore, the \expectations-based" optimal rule does not always lead
to determinacy and learnability for all parameter values as in the standard "new keynesian"
case.
Proposition 5. Under the expectations-based optimal rule derived under discretion the neces-
sary and su±cient condition for a rational expectations equilibrium to be determinate is that
·2´ (¾ ¡ ´)
(¯ + · + 1)
< ¸ <
·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
Proof. See appendix E.
Proposition 6. Under the expectations-based optimal rule derived under discretion the neces-
sary and su±cient condition for a MSV solution (0;c) to be E-stable is that
¸ <
·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
Proof. See appendix F.
Using our baseline calibration, Propositions 5 and 6 imply that the \expectations-based"
optimal rule leads to a determinate REE as long as ¸ ranges between 0:05 and 0:24 and E-
stability follows if ¸ is lower than 0:24: For robustness, we also evaluate this ¯nding under
alternative parameterizations as in Woodford (1999, W), CGG (2000) and McCallum and Nel-
son (1999, MN). Table 2 below summarizes the alternative parameterizations. Note that under
Woodford¶s parameterization the slope coe±cient of the Phillips curve is ten times smaller than
the ones of CGG and MN (0:024 compared to 0:3); hence the e®ect of the output gap over
in°ation through the Phillips curve will be signi¯cantly smaller and the cost channel e®ect
will become relative more important. Intuitively this explains why the permissible parameter
range for ¸ to guarantee both determinacy and E-stability shrinks under Woodford (1999)'s
calibration. We also ask whether the determinacy and E-stability are attainable if the central
bank uses the optimal ¸RW: Table 2 shows that only under Woodford¶s parameterization, ¸RW
17lies inside the ranges for determinacy and E-stability. Interestingly, these results imply that
the cost channel imposes tight restrictions even for optimal policy.
Table 2: Policy restrictions under discretion - \expectations-based"
Baseline W (1999) CGG (2000) MN (1999)
¾ 1:5 0:157 1 1=0:164
·x 0:21 0:024 0:3 0:3
Determinacy 0:05 < ¸ < 0:24 ¸ < 0:05 ¸ < 0:32 0:28 < ¸ < 0:39
E-stability ¸ < 0:24 ¸ < 0:05 ¸ < 0:32 ¸ < 0:39
Optimal ¸RW 0:29 0:03 0:40 0:40
EH (2003) provide an intuition about why the \expectations-based" reaction function al-
ways leads to stability under both determinacy and learning. They argue that under such
policy rule the traditional Taylor principle always holds, i.e. Á¼ > 1; and thus, the central
bank succeeds in stabilizing the economy towards the optimal REE. In contrast, in a model in
which monetary policy works also through the cost channel this is no longer true. As we showed
earlier, the traditional Taylor principle does not guarantee determinacy and learnability of the
forward data Taylor rule (10);which indeed it has the same form of the \expectations-based"
rule (24). Furthermore, under the forward data Taylor rule, the traditional Taylor principle
does not imply its long-run version and consequently an active reaction against in°ation ex-
pectations is not su±cient for determinacy and E-stability. As a consequence, when the cost
channel matters and under discretionary policy, there are some parameter values under which
the economy displays indeterminacy and/or expectational instability.
A key question is which conditions of Proposition 3 and 4 do not hold under the \expec-
tations - based" rule and hence generate the indeterminacy and E-instability result. Figure
(3) plots the determinacy and E-stable regions of the Taylor rule with forward data (10) as
in ¯gure (2). The dotted lines correspond to the rays fÁs
¼;Ás
xg and fÁ¼;Áxg given by the
\expectations-based" rule (24). The rays plot the combination of optimal parameters under
di®erent values of ¸ (ranging from 0 to 1). Under the baseline model, the ray always stays
in the determinate and E-stable area. Under the cost channel model, the numerical results
show that as ¸ increases, both Á¼ and Áx decrease and the ray crosses the long-run Taylor
principle. We check this result by plugging the optimal parameters Á¼ and Áx into the long-run
Taylor principle. The resulting expression collapses to the following condition, con¯rming that
E-stability requires Proposition 5.
¾
¡



































Figure 3: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for forward expectations policy rules. Left panel
corresponds to the baseline model (± = 0). Right panel corresponds to the cost channel model (± = 1): The
dotted lines plot the optimal parameters Á¼ and Áx under the \expectations-based" rule derived under discretion.
Another interesting implication of the previous analysis is that there exists a con°ict between
the desirable properties of an optimal discretionary rule in terms of the volatility that it entails
and the learnability and determinacy criteria. Indeed, note that optimal condition (21) shows
that the cost channel increases the trade-o® between stabilizing in°ation and the output gap
(·0 < ·x) and simultaneously it implies smaller optimal reaction to expected in°ation with
respect to the baseline model (Á¼ < Ás
¼). Yet, as shown in ¯gure (3), the latter might induce
undesirable properties in terms of both learnability and determinacy. Hence, the achievement of
determinacy and learnability under the cost channel would imply a bigger reaction to in°ation
expectations - as the baseline model suggests (Ás
¼) - at the cost of larger macroeconomic
volatility.
To sum up, our results suggest that EH¶s proposal to solve the instability of \fundamental-
based" rules by conditioning optimally on private sector expectations, can be misleading when
the cost channel matters. As it was shown, the possible solution to this issue, as suggested by
EH (2003), does not always provide stability under learning. As the next section will prove,
this conclusion emerges also when the policymaker commits to an optimal policy rule.
193.2.2 Commitment Policy















xt ¡ xt+1 + 1
¾(it ¡ ¼t+1)
¤
+'2;t [¼t ¡ ¯¼t+1 ¡ ·xxt ¡ ±·it]
)
¡ '1;0¼0 (26)




'1;t¡1 + '2;t ¡ '2;t¡1 = 0 (27)
¸xt + '1;t ¡
1
¯
'1;t¡1 ¡ ·x'2;t = 0 (28)
1
¾
'1;t ¡ ±·'2;t = 0 (29)
and ¼0 = ¼0:
Combining (27), (28), (29) we get the following set of equations18,
'2;t = (1 + ¯¡1±·)'2;t¡1 ¡ ¼t (30)
xt = ¸¡1¯¡1¾±·'2;t¡1 + ¸¡1 (·x ¡ ¾±·)'2;t (31)
Combining equations (1), (2) with (30) and (31), we can obtain the following reduced form,
yt = A + BEtyt+1 + Cyt¡1 + D¹t (32)
where yt = [¼t;'2;t]0;A = 0; and
B = #
"
¯¸(¯ + ±o) ¾¯±o·o




























¢¡1, ±o = ±· and ·o ´ ·x ¡ ±·¾:
The MSV solution of (32) can be written as a function of the lagrange multiplier, '2;t¡1;
18Note that di®erent from the standard case, analyzed by EH (2006), we cannot eliminate the lagrange
multipliers in order to get a tractable system.
20and the fundamental shock, ¹t;
¼t = b¼'2;t¡1 + c¼¹t (33)
'2;t = b''2;t¡1 + c'¹t (34)
After replacing (33) and (34) (and their respective expected values) into (32), we obtain the
following polynomial characterizing b'
¯b2
' ¡ °b' + 1 = 0 (35)
where ° = (¾2±2
o+¯·2
o+¸¯)+¸(¯+±o)2
(¸(¯+±o)¡¾·o±o) : Unlike the standard model, both roots of (35) are not
necessarily positive. To have positive roots we need ° to be positive, which translates to the








This root delivers a stationary REE, since 0 < b' < 1. The rest of coe±cients are given:















We refer to this REE as the optimal REE. The next proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 7. The optimal REE under a commitment policy is characterized by 0 < b' < 1




Fundamental-based reaction function The \fundamental based" rule implies that the
central bank assumes that private agents have perfectly RE and that the REE takes the form
of the MSV solution. We replace the RRE solution of the form of (33) and (34), and their
respective expectations into the structural relationships (1) and (2)¡ after using (31) . Then,
we solve for it and the resulting equation is called \fundamental-based" optimal rule,
it = Á''2;t¡1 + Á¹¹t (36)





























1 + c¼ (¡1 + ¯½)¾2 + b¼¯¸((¡1 + c¼)¸ + ¯c'·o½¾)
¢
!
with ¢ = ¸
¡







Combining the \fundamental-based" reaction function (36) with (1), (2) and (31) we col-




















with Ã = (¯·o ¡ ¾±o)
¡1, ±o ´ ±· and ·o ´ ·x ¡ ±·¾: The MSV solution can be written as





Next, we analyze whether the \fundamental-based" optimal policy guarantees a learnable
REE. Under the standard new Keynesian model, EH (2006) show that the fundamental reaction
function leads to instability under learning. Remarkably, our results stand in contrast with
those of EH(2006). In fact, the fundamental-based reaction function (36) can induce a E-stable
under a speci¯c parameterization. In particular, if the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (¾) is greater than the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply
(´) the REE is E-stable.
Proposition 8. Under the fundamental-based reaction function derived under commitment,
the necessary and su±cient condition for the optimal REE to be E-stable is that ¾ > ¯´
Proof. See appendix G.
Proposition 8 shows how in the model with the cost channel the strength of demand-side
e®ects is crucial for E-stability. The intuition follows the analysis of contemporaneous rules. In
that case, we emphasized that if ´ < ¾ and the central bank's aggressiveness against in°ation
are too high, ¯rms will raise prices even for a negative output gap because the cost channel
dominates the reduction of real wages (due to lower output). Thus, high enough interest rate
can generate self-ful¯lling in°ation expectations. In the case of the fundamental optimal rule
under commitment such intuition applies to E-stability.
22Determinacy is evaluated numerically and for this case ¸ is treated as a free policy pa-
rameter ranging from 0 to 1. Numerical results reveal that for the benchmark calibration
determinacy is guaranteed if ¸ > 0:05 and the REE is always E-stable. We also check whether
alternative calibrations yield determinacy and stability under learning; see Table 3 below. Fur-
thermore, the optimal fundamental rule delivers both determinacy and learnability under most
parameterizations . Thus, three out of four parameterizations guarantee determinacy and E-
stability under ¸RW. Woodford's parameterization is the only one that induces expectational
instability and indeterminacy under the optimal ¸RW: The latter may be explained by the fact
that in Woodford¶s parameterization the e®ect of the output gap over in°ation through the
Phillips curve will be signi¯cantly smaller than that of the cost channel.
Table 3: Policy restrictions under commitment - \fundamental-based"
Baseline W (1999) CGG (2000) MN (1999)
Determinacy 0:05 < ¸ 0:44 < ¸ 0:02 < ¸ 0:11 < ¸
E-stability Yes No Yes Yes
Optimal ¸RW 0:29 0:03 0:40 0:40
Note: Parameterizations are the same as in Table 2
The above results bring about some interesting implications. First, a commitment policy
that assumes RE delivers determinacy and E-stability when monetary also works through the
cost channel if and only if the strength of the demand channel exceeds that of the cost channel.
Second, if an optimal ¸RW is chosen, the fundamental based rule under commitment is more
likely to generate both determinacy and E-stability than the expectations based rule under
discretion. This last result indicates that the ability to commit may help in the alleviation of
the instability problem when the cost channel is present without conditioning policy response
to in°ation expectations. Yet, this type of policy could be less appealing given the di±culties
that the implementation of fundamental rules impose in practice.
Expectations-based reaction function Following EH (2006) we also study the so-called
"expectations-based" optimal rule under commitment. After plugging (30) and (31) into the
aggregate supply (1), we can replace xt for '2;t: Then, we express the aggregate demand (2)
in terms of '2;t by using equation (31). By solving it from the resulting equations, we get the
following expression for the \expected-based" optimal rule,









¢¡1 (1 + ¯¡1±o + ·x¸¡1¯¡1¾±o)
¸(·o ¡ ¯¡1¾±o)
























¡1 ¾¡1 ¡ ±o (·x¸¡1·o + 1)
¡1
The reduced form dynamics for the vector yt = [¼t;'2;t]0 under takes the form of (32), where

























: In appendix H it is shown that a necessary condition for determinacy is the same to
the one characterizing the optimal REE (see proposition 7).
Proposition 9. Under the expected-based reaction function derived under commitment, the




Proof. See appendix H.
In the standard sticky price model, EH (2006) prove that the \expectations-based" reaction
function guarantees stability under learning for all parameter con¯gurations. In contrast, when
the economy features the cost channel, the \expectations-based" policy rule given by (37), may
or may not guarantee E-stability of the optimal REE.
Proposition 10. Under the expected-based reaction function derived under commitment, the




·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
24Proof. See appendix I.
We evaluate numerically the thresholds given in Proposition 9 and 10 (see Table 4 below).
In the case of E-stability, W(1999)'s calibration has yielded a tighter space for ¸ compared to
the rest. This is because in Woodford¶s parameterization the e®ect of the output gap over
in°ation through the aggregate supply is signi¯cantly smaller than the cost channel e®ect and
therefore it is harder to induce E-stability. Yet, W(1999)'s calibration is the only one in which
both determinacy and E-stability are always guarantee if an optimal ¸RW is chosen. The
bottom line is that EH¶s proposal to the resolution of the instability does not always work
even for commitment policies when the cost channel matters.
Table 4: Policy restrictions under commitment - \expectational-based"
Baseline W (1999) CGG (2000) MN (1999)
Determinacy 0:01 < ¸ 0 < ¸ 0:02 < ¸ 0:11 < ¸
E-stability 0:12 < ¸ < 0:24 0 < ¸ < 0:05 0:13 < ¸ < 0:32 0:25 < ¸ < 0:39
Optimal ¸RW 0:29 0:03 0:40 0:40
Note: Parameterizations are the same as in Table 2
We summarize our main results under target rules as follows. First, when the cost channel
matters, conditioning policy on private sector expectations threatens E-stability under both
discretion and commitment. Second, a policy that it is a source of instability under learning
without the cost channel, i.e. \fundamental rule" under commitment, is a possible antidote
when the cost channel is active. The \fundamental rule" under commitment (32) considers
a reaction to a lag multiplier which captures the importance of history or lag endogenous
variables under commitment. Hence, this ¯ndding suggests that problems of instability under
learning when the cost channel is active might be mitigated by endowing instrument rules with
interest rate smoothing as Bullard and Mitra (2006) pointed out.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied determinacy and E-stability of di®erent monetary policy rules
when the cost channel matters. Particularly, we have extended BM (2002) and EH (2003,
2006) analyses in the presence of supply side e®ects of monetary policy through the cost
channel. Our results show that the cost channel modi¯es the standard conditions for both
determinacy and learnability when the central banks operates with either instrument or target
rules. Remarkably, the traditional Taylor principle does not implies its long-run version in a
model with the cost channel.
25In general, the presence of the cost channel threatens the determinacy and learnability of the
rational expectations equilibrium. Moreover, popular policies to counteract instability, like the
traditional Taylor principle or \expectations-based" reaction functions, may not be e®ective
or could even be counterproductive. Interestingly, a policy that it is a source of instability
under learning without the cost channel, i.e. \fundamental rule" under commitment, is a
possible antidote when the cost channel is active. The bottom line is that either BM's or EH¶s
proposals to the resolution of the instability under learning cannot be taken for granted when
the cost channel matters.
5 Appendices
5.1 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The characteristic polynomial of ­ (given by 6) is P (») = »2 + A1» + A0 where
A0 =
¾¯
¾ + Áx + (·x ¡ ·±¾)Á¼
(A1)
A1 =
¡¾ (1 + ¯) ¡ ¯Áx + ·x (Á¼ ¡ 1) ¡ [·±Áx + (·x ¡ ·±¾)Á¼]
¾ + Áx + (·x ¡ ·±¾)Á¼
(A2)
Both eigenvalues of ­ are inside the unit circle if and only if both of the following conditions
hold
jA0j < 1 (A3)
jA1j < 1 + A0: (A4)
We can note that condition (A3) is always true, whereas condition (A4) implies (7) and (8).
5.2 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
Using results of Evans and Honkapohja (2001, chapter 10), E-stability needs that the eigen-
values of ½­ (­ is given by equation. 6) to have real parts less than one. The eigenvalues of
½­ are given by the product of the eigenvalues of ­ and ½; and since 0 < ½ < 1; it su±ces that
eigenvalues of B to have real parts less than 1. On the other hand, the MSV solution will not
be E-stable if any eigenvalue of ­ has a real part greater than 1. The characteristic polynomial
of ­ ¡ I (where I is a corresponding identity matrix) given by P (») = »2 + A1» + A0 where
A1 =
¾ (1 ¡ ¯) + (·x ¡ ±·¾)Á¼ + Áx + ·x (Á¼ ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·)Áx
¾ + Áx + (·x ¡ ±·¾)Á¼
(B1)
26A0 =
(1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·)Áx + ·x (Á¼ ¡ 1)
¾ + Áx + (·x ¡ ±·¾)Á¼
(B2)
It is necessary for both eigenvalues of ­ ¡ I to have negative real parts. According to the
Routh Theorem, that condition holds if and only if A1 > 0 and A0 > 0. We can note that
A1 = A0 +
¾ (1 ¡ ¯) + (·x ¡ ±·¾)Á¼ + Áx
¾ + Áx + (·x ¡ ±·¾)Á¼
(B3)
Thus, given that ·x¡±·¾ equals ·´ when ± = 1; A0 > 0 implies A1 > 0: Hence, the E-stability
condition, given by (9), is derived from A0 > 0.
5.3 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
The characteristic polynomial of ­ (given by 11) is P (») = »2 + A1» + A0 where
A0 =




Áx + ·x (Á¼ ¡ 1) ¡ ¾ (¯ + 1) ¡ ±·¾Á¼
¾
(C2)
Both eigenvalues of ­ are inside the unit circle if and only if conditions (A3) and (A4) hold.
We can note that condition (A3) implies (12) and (13), whereas condition (A4) implies (14)
and (15).
5.4 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4
As in the previous case, E-stability conditions are given by analyzing the characteristic poly-
nomial of ­ ¡ I (where ­ is given by 11) given by P (») = »2 + A1» + A0 where
A1 =




Áx (1 ¡ ¯ ¡ ±·) + ·x (Á¼ ¡ 1)
¾
(D2)
are necessary for both eigenvalues of ­¡I to have negative real parts. According to the Routh
Theorem, that condition holds if and only if A1 > 0 and A0 > 0. We can note
A1 = A0 +
¾ (1 ¡ ¯) + (¯ + ·±)Áx ¡ ·±¾Á¼
¾
(D3)
Di®erent from the case of contemporaneous data, A0 > 0 does not imply A1 > 0: In this case,
the ¯rst E-stability condition, given by (16), is derived from A0 > 0. The second E-stability
27condition, given by (17), is derived from A1 > 0 (using equation D3), provided that A0 > 0:
5.5 Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 5
The characteristic polynomial of ­ (given by 25) has one eigenvalue equal to zero and the other
equal to (after replacing ·x and ·o and making ± = 1)
r =
¸¯ + ¸· ¡ ·2¾´
¸ + ·2´2 (E1)
Determinacy requires that jrj < 1 and thus the latter condition implies
·2´ (¾ ¡ ´)
(¯ + · + 1)
< ¸ <
·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
(E2)
5.6 Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 6
E-stability is guaranteed if and only if all of the eigenvalues of ­ ¡ I (where ­ is given by 25)
have negative real parts. The characteristic polynomial of ­¡I is given by ½(») = »2+A1»+A0
where
A1 = 1 +
¸ + ·2´2 + ·2´¾ ¡ ¸¯ ¡ ¸·
¸ + ·2´2 (F1)
A0 =
¸ + ·2´2 + ·2´¾ ¡ ¸¯ ¡ ¸·
¸ + ·2´2 (F2)
It is necessary for both eigenvalues of ­ ¡ I to have negative real parts. According to the
Routh Theorem, that condition holds if and only if A1 > 0 and A0 > 0: We can note
A1 = A0 + 1 (F3)
Thus, a su±cient condition for E-stability is that A0 > 0 implying
¸ <
·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
(F4)
5.7 Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 8
We apply the E-stability conditions derived in Evans and Honkapohja (2001, section 10.2.1):
DTa = ­(1 + b) (G1)
DTb = b
0
­ ­ + I ­ ­b (G2)
28DTc = ½0 ­ ­ + I ­ ­b (G3)
E-stability follows if all real parts of the eigenvalues of DTa;DTb and DTc are lower than 1.
A ¯rst necessary condition is that DTa ¡ I has eigenvalues with negative real parts, which is
equivalent to tr(DTa ¡ I) < 0 and det(DTa ¡ I) > 0.














where b¼ and b' are the coe±cients of the MSV at the REE. The determinant of DTa ¡ I is
given by the following expression




¾2·(1 ¡ ¯) + ¯·´·x + ¯¸b¼ + ¾¯·´b' (1 ¡ ¯)
¢
Which is positive i® (± = 1) ¾ > ¯´ since 0 < ¯ < 1; b¼ > 0 and b' > 0: Notice that without
the cost channel (± = 0) the expression is always negative and therefore DTa¡I is an unstable
matrix (see EH 2006). The trace of DTa ¡ I can be written as




¾ (2 ¡ ¯) + ¯´b' + ¾¡1·¡1¯¸b¼ + ¾¡1¯·´2 + ¯´ (¯ + · ¡ 1)
¢
and is always negative if and only if (± = 1) ¾ > ¯´. When the cost channel is absent (± = 0),
the trace is always positive and DTa ¡ I is an unstable matrix (see EH 2006).
We now turn to analyze the rest of matrices,


































































29The characteristic polynomial of DTb ¡ I is given by P (») = »4 + A3»3 + A2»2 + A1» + A0: It
can be shown that two of roots (e.g. »1 and »2) are equal to ¡1. The rest of roots are given















¡ 2b'¯±o·o¾ ¡ ±2
o¾2
¯·2




o ¡ ¯¸ ¡ b¼¯2¸ ¡ b¼¯±o¸ ¡ b'¯±o·o¾ ¡ ±2
o¾2
¯·2
o + ¯¸ + ±2
o¾2
and are always negative since 0 < b' < 1, 0 < b¼ and 0 < ¯ < 1: It follows the DTb ¡ I is a
stable matrix.
Finally, we analyze the stability of DTc ¡ I:













































The characteristic polynomial DTc ¡ I has the form of P (») = »4 + A3»3 + A2»2 + A1» + A0:
It can be shown that two of roots (e.g. »1 and »2) are equal to ¡1. The rest of roots are given
by the following expressions,
»3 =
¡¯·2




¡ b¼¯±o¸ ¡ ±o¯¸(1 ¡ ½) ¡ b'¯±o·o¾ ¡ ½¯±o·o¾ ¡ ±2
o¾2
¯·2




o ¡ ¯¸ ¡ b¼¯2¸ ¡ b¼¯±o¸ ¡ b'¯±o·o¾ ¡ ±2
o¾2
¯·2
o + ¯¸ + ±2
o¾2
and are always negative since 0 < b' < 1, 0 < b¼, 0 < ¯ < 1 and 0 < ½ < 1: It follows the
DTc ¡ I is a stable matrix.
305.8 Appendix H: Proof of Proposition 9
We use the approach of Woodford (2003, chapter 4) to perform the determinacy analysis. First,



















The system is determinate i® exactly one root lie inside the unit circle and the rest outside the
unit circle. As shown in Woodford (2003) the following cases guarantee determinacy:
either (Case I)
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 < 0; ¡1 + A2 ¡ A1 + A0 > 0
or (Case II):
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0; ¡1 + A2 ¡ A1 + A0 < 0;
A2
0 ¡ A0A2 + A1 ¡ 1 > 0
(Case III):
1 + A2 + A1 + A0 > 0; ¡1 + A2 ¡ A1 + A0 < 0
A2
0 ¡ A0A2 + A1 ¡ 1 < 0; jA2j > 3
Let the characteristic equation of the matrix ¨ be written in the form
P (») = »3 + A2»2 + A1» + A0
where
A2 = ¡
¯ (¯¸ + ±o¸ + ±o·o¾)
¡





¯·o·x + ¯¸ + ¯±o·o¾ + ±2
o¾2¢¡
¯·o·x + ¯¸ + ¯±o·o¾ + ±2






¯¸ + ±o¸ ¡ ±o·x¾ + ±2
o¾2¢¡
¯·o·x + ¯¸ + ¯±o·o¾ + ±2
o¾2¢
Ã
where Ã = 2¯2±o (¯ + ±o)·o¸¾
In the polynomial P (»), A1and A2 are always positive and negative, respectively. Note
A0 is negative i® ¯¸ + ±o¸ ¡ ±o·x¾ + ±2
o¾2 > 0. After replacing ±o and ·x, it turns out that
¸ > ·2¾´=(¯ + ·) guarantees A0's negativity. Note that such condition for ¸ characterizes the
optimal REE (see proposition 7 in the main text). Under such assumption, ¡1+A2¡A1+A0 <
310and then Case I is ruled out.
5.9 Appendix I: Proof of Proposition 10
We apply the E-stability conditions provided in Appendix H to model under (37). A ¯rst
necessary condition is that DTa¡I has eigenvalues with negative real parts, which is equivalent
to tr(DTa ¡ I) < 0 and det(DTa ¡ I) > 0.


















where b¼ and b' are the coe±cients of the MSV at the REE. The determinant of DTa ¡ I is
given by the following expression
det(DTa ¡ I) =
¯ [·o·x ¡ (¯ + ±o ¡ 1)¸] + ±o [¸(¯ + ±o) ¡ ·o¾]
±2
o¾2 + ¯ (¸ + ·o (·x + ±o¾))
+











o¾2 + ¯ (¸ + ·o (·x + ±o¾))
There two necessary and su±cient conditions for det(DTa ¡ I) to be positive.
·o·x ¡ (¯ + ±o ¡ 1)¸ > 0 ! ¸ <
·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
¸(¯ + ±o) ¡ ·o¾ > 0 ! ¸ >
·´¾
¯ + ·
Notice that under the standard new Keynesian framework ±o is zero and det(DTa¡I) is always
positive for all parameters value (see EH 2006).
The trace of DTa ¡ I can be written as
tr(DTa¡I) =
¡¯ [·o·x ¡ (¯ + ±o ¡ 1)¸] ¡ b¼¯ (¯ + ±o)¸ ¡ 2±2





o¾2 + ¯ (¸ + ·o (·x + ±o¾))
which is always negative i®
·o·x ¡ (¯ + ±o ¡ 1)¸ > 0 ! ¸ <
·2´ (´ + ¾)
(¯ + · ¡ 1)
Again, under the standard new Keynesian framework ±o is zero and tr(DTa ¡ I) is always
negative regardless the parametrization (see EH 2006).
32We now turn to the rest of matrices,






















































The characteristic polynomial of DTb ¡ I is given by P (») = »4 + A3»3 + A2»2 + A1» + A0: It
can be shown that two of roots (e.g. »1 and »2) are equal to -1. The rest of roots are given by
the following expressions,
»3 =











·2´2 + (1 ¡ ¯)¸
¤
¡ ±2







o¾2 + ¯ (¸ + ·o (·x + ±o¾))
and are always negative since 0 < b' < 1, 0 < b¼ and 0 < ¯ < 1: It follows the DTb ¡ I is a
stable matrix.
Finally, we analyze the stability of DTc ¡ I:





































33The characteristic polynomial DTc ¡ I has the form of P (») = »4 + A3»3 + A2»2 + A1» + A0:
It can be shown that two of roots (e.g. »1 and »2) are equal to -1. The rest of roots are given
by the following expressions,
»3 =











·2´2 + (1 ¡ ½¯)¸ + ±o¸(1 ¡ ½)
¤
¡ ±2











o¾2 + ¯ (¸ + ·o (·x + ±o¾))
and are always negative since 0 < b' < 1, 0 < b¼; 0 < ¯ < 1and 0 < ½ < 1: It follows the
DTc ¡ I is a stable matrix.
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